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Gender, Corruption, and Culture:
Evidence from the American States
by Luke Bell

Introduction

In recent years, several influential studies have reported that high levels of
female representation in national legislatures seem to correspond with low levels
of countrywide corruption. Scholars have expressed excitement at the prospect that
simply adding women to government will “diminish the need for a painful, expensive, and politically difficult process of rooting out corruption via oversight and
prosecution” (Esarey and Chirillo 2013: 364). Some governments have launched
initiatives to increase the number of women in positions of public responsibility as
a means of combating corrupt behavior. Peru, for example, recently created an allwomen police division in an attempt to curb instances of extortion in traffic ticketing, and Mexico took similar action several years later (Karim 2011; Keating 2013).
Does the mere presence of female public officials truly ward off corruption, or are
other factors at work?
This paper focuses on whether female representation in American state legislatures is negatively correlated with levels of state corruption, controlling for institutions and other state characteristics. I begin by reviewing existing explanations for
the association between female participation and corruption, after which I lay out
my theory and hypotheses. Next, I describe the variables, data sources, and quantitative models I used to test my hypotheses and present empirical results. Overall, I
find that the proportion of women in state legislatures is significantly and negatively
correlated with corruption in cross-sectional models. I argue that state corruption is
better explained by broader political cultural factors that vary between states, such as
female opportunity in general, education, and other within-state dynamics.
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Literature Review

The debate over whether women bring a purifying presence to the public sphere
is not new. Orestes Brownson, a prominent anti-suffragist, summarizes a common
suffragette argument, stating “We have heard it argued that, if women were to take
part in our elections . . . her presence would do more than a whole army of police officials to maintain order, to banish all fighting, drinking, . . . venality, and corruption”
(Brownson 1869). Recent research by World Bank scholars has rekindled the debate
about whether women really are the “fairer sex.” In a 2001 study, David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti find a persistent negative correlation between the
proportion of women in national legislatures and perceived corruption. These findings, replicated with three distinct corruption measures on a cross-sectional sample
of over one hundred countries, retain significance in the presence of controls for
civil liberties, population, GDP, region, and ethnic fractionalization (Dollar, Fisman,
and Gatti 2001). A contemporaneous study using several cross-national corruption
measures, micro-level surveys of Georgian businesses, and attitudinal data from the
World Values Survey also produces evidence of a link between gender and corruption (Swamy et al. 2001). The authors find that “greater participation by women in
the market and government is associated with lower levels of corruption” and that
women are less likely than men to condone hypothetical scenarios of corrupt behavior (Swamy et al. 2001: 27).
Scholarly studies on female political representation and corruption offer several
explanations for the correlations observed in the studies mentioned above. In general,
academic explanations for the apparent association between gender and levels of corruption can be grouped into four categories: gender gap in corrupt behavior, democratic institutions, institutional deterrence, and political culture. I discuss each of these
schools of thought in turn, drawing on literature from various behavioral disciplines.
Gender Gap
Those who subscribe to the “gender gap” argument, broadly speaking, tend to
claim that female participation in government is negatively correlated with corruption, because women infuse honesty into the public sphere. These explanations draw
on attitudinal studies, which, on the whole, suggest that women are more ethical than
men. One such study finds that female U.S. Coast Guard employees score significantly higher than their male counterparts on “Defining Issues Tests,” questionnaires
that confront respondents with various moral dilemmas (White Jr. 1999: 467). Similarly, a meta-analysis of fifty-six tests of this type finds that women are substantially
more likely to volunteer ethical responses than men at all age and education levels
(Thoma 1986). Business ethics studies also assert that women hold to higher ethical
standards in inter-personal situations (Dawson 1997) and express greater intolerance
for unethical practices (Franke, Crown, and Spake 1997; Glover et al. 1997).
Regarding corruption specifically, Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti use gender gap logic
to explain their results, tracing the relationship between female representation and
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corruption to the female propensity to exhibit “higher standards of ethical behavior
and be more concerned with the common good” (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001: 427).
Using this same line of reasoning, Swamy et al. conclude “there is indeed a gender
differential in tolerance for corruption” (Swamy et al. 2001: 51). Citing original experimental evidence, Rivas, too, claims women are less corrupt than men and “increasing
participation by women in . . . politics would be expected to help in fighting corruption” (Rivas 2008: 32).
Democratic Institutions
Rejecting the gender gap explanation for the correlation between female representation and corruption, other scholars argue that the connection can be explained
by variation in political institutions between countries. Hung-en Sung, for instance,
argues that “both female participation in government and lower levels of corruption
are dependent on a liberal democratic polity” (Sung 2003: 703). That is, he asserts,
the relationship between female political involvement and low levels of corruption
is spurious in that both variables are caused not by gendered differences in behavior,
but macro-level features of liberal democracy such as a free press, independent judiciary, and the rule of law (Sung 2003). In a separate panel study, Sung reveals further
evidence that liberal democracy mediates the link between female participation and
corruption, concluding that the strength of democracy is a significant predictor of
both corruption and women in government (Sung 2012: 213).
Institutional Deterrence
A third thread of research modifies individual-level gender gap explanations of
corruption to account for institutional deterrence. Experimental studies suggest that
women’s willingness to engage in corruption may depend on perceptions of monitoring and risk (Schulze and Frank 2003: 16; Armantier and Boly 2011). An experiment
in Burkina Faso, for instance, examines how participants instructed to grade papers
react when offered a bribe in exchange for a passing grade. The researchers find that
female graders are less likely to accept bribes than their male counterparts but only
when the risk of detection is high. Women are more likely to accept the bribe in the
absence of risk (Armantier and Boly 2011). Likewise, Justin Esarey and Gina Chirillo
argue that because they are held to higher ethical standards and are more likely to
be punished than men, women in corruption-averse societies respond to systemic
discriminatory incentives to avoid corrupt behavior (Esarey and Chirillo 2013). Similarly, Anne Marie Goetz argues that women in liberal democracies do not have the
same opportunities for corrupt behavior as men; given the opportunity to abuse
power, she argues, women “will not passively conform to the idealized notions
of their finer moral nature” (Goetz 2007: 102). In brief, these arguments find that
individual-level female characteristic interact with systematic incentives such as
monitoring and enforcement, and that this interaction effectively explains the gendercorruption connection.
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Political Culture
In contrast to the gender gap, democratic institutional, and institutional deterrence explanations described above, I argue that the relationship between high
female representation and low corruption is driven by the existence of political cultures characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness, as evidenced by high levels
of overall female opportunity. International studies have found that countries with
an “egalitarian culture” are significantly more likely to have large proportions of
women represented in parliament (Kenworthy and Malami 1999: 24; Matland 1998:
121). Moreover, countries where public support for gender egalitarianism is high are
substantially more likely to exhibit lower levels of corruption overall (Seleim and
Bontis 2009). Corroborating the importance of political culture, a survey measuring
corruption-related attitudes of public officials in Ghana suggests that an infusion
of female officials does little to curb corruption when opportunities, networks, and
social expectations for corruption remain in place (Alhassan-Aloho 2007: 236). Taken
on the whole, the political cultural hypothesis suggests that simply adding women to
government may not alleviate corruption unless the increase in female representation
corresponds with more fundamental cultural changes.
Of course, the demarcation between institutions and political culture is vague, if
not completely fluid. Institutions are, in many ways, a reflection of the cultures that
adopt them, and cultural values can be influenced by institutional forces. That said,
both democratic and deterrence institutional arguments focus on how the presence
of institutions themselves affects the gender-corruption relationship, whereas my
research attempts to examine gender, culture, and corruption, holding institutions
constant. Consequently, while political culture is connected to the institutions present
in a given society, I treat the two as separate concepts in my analysis.

Case Selection

With these potential explanations—gender, democratic institutions, institutional
deterrence, and political culture—in mind, I attempt to add to the debate on whether
the presence of women in politics has an independent negative effect on corruption.
To do so, I analyze overall state corruption and female participation in the legislatures of the fifty U.S. states. The setting of the U.S. offers several advantages. For one,
government structure is relatively standard across the country, and each state has an
independent judiciary and well-established respect for principles such as the rule of
law and freedom of the press. State electoral systems are also quite similar. The vast
majority of states have bi-cameral legislatures and independent executive branches
(though there is some interstate variation in branch power).
Additionally, as part of the U.S., the states share a liberal democratic heritage
that encourages citizens and elites to frown on abuses of public power. Since my
entire universe of cases resides within a democratic context, my research will evaluate whether an increased female presence in government tends to reduce corruption,
absent of significant variation in levels of liberal democracy. My results will also yield
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insight into whether the number of women in government affects corruption within
a country where, on the whole, corruption is highly stigmatized. In short, this paper
contributes to existing literature by examining the link between gender and corruption within the purely democratic context of the American states.

Theory and Hypotheses

Because observational and experimental studies yield mixed evidence about
the link between female representation and corruption, my research has two principal objectives:
1. Determine whether the negative correlation between female political representation and corruption holds within the liberal democratic context of the
American states.
2. Determine whether the correlation can be attributed primarily to a gender gap in
corrupt behavior, state institutions, institutional deterrence, or political culture.
With regard to the first objective, I postulate that the correlation between gender and
corruption will persist among the American states. Stated formally:
H1: There is a negative cross-sectional correlation between female representation and
state corruption.
Given that both this and cross-national studies evaluate the relationship between
individual legislator characteristics and overall corruption among public officials
(rather than corruption in the legislature alone), the relationship cannot simply be
traced to a feminine Midas touch for reducing unethical behavior. Even if women are
significantly less corrupt than men at the individual-level, using individual legislator
characteristics to make inferences about an aggregate-level phenomenon is logically
inappropriate. As Sung notes, this type of reasoning causes researchers to “risk aggregative error associated with the individualist fallacy” (Sung 2003: 705). This is especially true because the gender makeup of the legislature may not reflect the gender
composition of the vast pool of other public officials. Consequently, evaluating the
proportion of women in the legislature does not lend itself to individual-level inferences about overall corruption among public officials. Given that individual legislator
traits and the overall number of corruption convictions are not on the same logical
plane, the gender gap explanation does not seem to hold water.
While it is possible that differences in political institutions are important determinants of cross-national variation in corruption, I do not believe that aspects of
liberal democracy are the missing nexus between gender and corruption in the
United States. For one, the American political arena, unlike the international political atmosphere, features government institutions that are extremely similar across
states. Minute institutional fluctuations such as campaign finance initiative, referendum, and recall laws are also unlikely to have discernible effects on corruption
rates (Meier and Holbrook 1992: 145). What is more, differences in institutions fail
to account for meaningful interstate variation in female representation (Hill 1981:
159). Hence, I argue that the presence of democratic institutions does not adequately
126

SIGMA
explain the relationship between female representation and corruption, leading to
my second hypothesis:
H2: The relationship between female representation and corruption remains statistically
significant in the presence of institutional controls.
If neither gender gap nor democratic institutional theories adequately explain
the relationship between female political involvement and corruption, does institutional deterrence? On one hand, experimental studies provide evidence that women
may behave more or less ethically than men depending on levels of risk. And the
American corruption literature shows that deterrence is a strong predictor of state
corruption (Alt and Lassen 2011; Goel and Nelson 1998). While institutions that discourage corruption may alter individual female behavior, deterrence likely does not
explain the macro-level relationship between corruption and female representation
for the same reasons that gender gap theories are unconvincing: individual-level
reactions to institutional incentives do not logically aggregate to statewide reductions
in corruption. Although deterrence is associated with lower overall corruption rates in
the U.S., I argue that the relationship between female representation and corruption
will remain largely the same when deterrence is taken into consideration. Thus:
H3: The relationship between female representation and corruption remains statistically
significant in the presence of controls for institutional deterrence.
The Importance of Political Culture
Departing from the gender gap, democratic institutional, and institutional
deterrence explanations, I argue that the correlation between corruption and female
representation is best explained in terms of the political culture (of which female representation is a part) in which corruption and gender interact. This assertion raises
the question: what is political culture? Admittedly, political culture is a somewhat
amorphous concept that has been broadly construed to encompass a host of different
variables, particularly in relation to corruption. David C. Nice, for example, traces
much of the interstate variation in corruption convictions to political culture, which
he defines as levels of education and urbanization (Nice 1983). In the international
context, Seymour Lipset and Gabriel Lenz discuss political culture in terms of country characteristics like income inequality, education, social diversity, and ethnic fractionalization (Lipset and Lenz 2000).
Political culture has also been used to describe a country’s religious environment.
Treisman, argues that the moral individualism stressed by protestant denominations
may be partially responsible for the formation of “legal cultures” that discourage
corrupt behavior (Treisman 2000). Others use a more attitudinal approach; studies of
female participation in state legislatures discuss political culture in terms of public
attitudes toward female involvement in government and sex roles more generally
(Hill 1981). American public-opinion research, on the other hand, emphasizes the
importance of ideology and partisanship as indicators of “unique political cultures of
individual states” (Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987L: 798).
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I again note that the distinction drawn between political culture and institutions
may be overly fine. Political institutions reflect the underlying values of the society
that adopts them, and cultural attitudes may change or be reinforced by institutional incentives. This is particularly true of deterrence. A strong societal emphasis
on exposing illicit behavior is an element of political culture, but usually manifests
itself in institutions that deter corruption. That said, because this paper attempts to
parse out whether the relationship between female representation and corruption is
an explicit function of institutional incentives or is somehow reflective of state political values, I sacrifice a certain degree of complexity for the sake of theoretical clarity.
Elements of State Political Culture
In any event, the examples articulated above illustrate that, to some extent, the
definition of political culture is contingent upon the context in which it is used. In
my research, I do not presume to offer an exhaustive definition of political culture.
Truly, any attempt to do so would extend well beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
I emphasize specific elements of political culture conceivably related to corruption
in the American states, namely, opportunities for women, education, legislative professionalism, citizen and elite ideology, political competition, and deterrence. In the
paragraphs that follow, I justify my use of these variables in relation to their potential
bearing on state corruption.
The opportunities available to women in both public and private spheres, a central concern of this paper, are an essential part of political culture as it relates to corruption. Female opportunity may be a reflection of the values and social norms of a
given state and, therefore, may be linked to ideas about fairness, egalitarianism, and
the individual in relation to society and government. Put differently, high proportions of women in public office may be associated with a political culture that stresses
inclusion and equal opportunity, which are in turn associated with low tolerance for
violations of public trust. Several studies mentioned previously find that egalitarian
cultures tend to have strong female political representation (Kenworthy and Malami
1999: 24; Matland 1998: 121) and that countries that support gender egalitarianism
experience low levels of corruption (Seleim and Bontis 2009).
Popular conceptions of state government and society may also relate to attitudes
about corruption as well as gender. Drawing on the categories of political culture
pioneered by Daniel Elazar (Elazar 1972), John G. Peters and Susan Welch find that
legislators in states with a “moralistic culture” that emphasizes the common good
over personal interests tend to be less tolerant of corruption than those in more individualistic or traditional cultures (Peters and Welch 1978). Likewise, Diamond argues
that moralistic cultures offer more female opportunity, since states with such cultures
are more “receptive to the values and style that have been associated with women—
concern with the public welfare rather than private enrichment” (Diamond 1977: 165).
Because political cultures in which the public good is placed at a premium are likely
to simultaneously encourage female inclusion and frown on corruption—an obvious
128

SIGMA
threat to collective welfare—I assert that states with a political culture that fosters
greater female opportunity will exhibit lower levels of corruption. That said, I note
that while the proportion of female legislators is a useful proxy for female opportunity and progressive political culture more generally, a more broadly applicable measure for female opportunity will provide a better estimation of state political values.
Accordingly, I present my third and fourth hypotheses:
H4: A state’s overall levels of overall female opportunity will have a more meaningful
effect on corruption than does the proportion of women in the state legislature.
H5: In the long term, female legislative representation will not be significantly correlated
with corruption, though overall female opportunity will remain significant over time.
While measures of female opportunity may prove to be useful gauges of state
attitudes, political culture clearly encompasses more than attitudes about gender and
equality alone. Though not directly related to my hypotheses per se, levels of citizen
education and legislative professionalism are also relevant aspects of political culture.
Scholars find that high levels of public education correspond to both increased female
legislative representation (Camboreco and Barnelo 2003) and decreased levels of corruption (Nice 1983). Similarly, legislative professionalism, measured in terms of a state
legislature’s session length, salary, and staff, often result in lower levels of female representation (Squire 1992). Professionalized legislatures could provide more opportunities for corruption, since legislators who are drawn to a professional political career
may be more motivated by self-interest than are those in citizen legislatures. At the
same time, the direction of the effect of professionalism on corruption is not clear,
since legislators with higher salaries, prestige, and resources may have more incentives
to avoid removal from office than citizen legislators, who might be tempted to supplement their meager state salaries with proceeds from illicit political favors.
Though not obviously related to female legislative representation, I also consider
citizen and elite ideology and political competition to control for factors commonly
understood to have a significance on a state’s political dynamic. State political environments marked by stiff political competition may discourage corruption, since the
risk of exposure and consequent removal from office is higher when elections are
close and rival candidates are actively seeking campaign material. Ideology, which
varies in distinct patterns between states, also has important ramifications for public
attitudes and could relate to tolerance for unethical behavior in government (Erikson,
McIver, and Wright 1987).

Data

Measuring Corruption: Dependent Variable
For the purposes of my research, I define corruption as the “misuse of public
power for private gain” (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91). In the American corruption literature, scholars traditionally utilize one of two operational strategies to measure
corruption. The first relies on the number of convictions of public officeholders, as
reported the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice (Department of
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Justice 2014). The corruption conviction count for a given state reflects all indictments
of public officials, elected or appointed.
The second strategy attempts to replicate the expert surveys used to measure
perceptions of corruption in the cross-national context. The only such survey for the
American states is a questionnaire distributed to reporters covering the House of
Representatives in each state during legislative sessions in 1999. The survey data is
limited to the forty-five states where reporters responded and is only available for
one year (Boylan and Long 2003). In contrast, corruption conviction data are publicly available for every state in each year dating back to 1976. I use the number of
U.S. Department of Justice corruption indictments within a given state, normalized
by state population as the primary dependent variable in my analysis. By doing so,
I significantly increase the number of cases in the sample and allow for panel analysis. Moreover, the conviction-based corruption measure facilitates comparison with
a large body of state corruption literature, since the majority of relevant studies use
normalized convictions as a dependent variable (Nice 1983; Meier and Holbrook
1992; Goel and Nelson 1998; Maxwell and Winters 2005; Glaeser and Saks 2006;
Alt and Lassen 2008; Alt and Lassen 2011). In any case, the convictions variable
correlates positively with the Boylan and Long measure, consistent with comparable research (Alt and Lassen 2008: 40). Even so, I test the robustness of my results
using the survey data, as reported in the New York Times (Boylan and Long 2003;
Marsh 2008).
Like any proxy for actual corruption, the conviction-based measure has limitations, foremost among which is that it only accounts for overt abuses of power
detected and found to be illegal. Since the conviction count variable is inherently
limited to illegal activities, it fails to capture behavior that is unethical, but not illegal.
Consequently, the scope of my analysis will inevitably leave out some “politically
interesting activities” that many Americans would likely perceive as corrupt (Meier
and Holbrook 1993; Peters and Welch 1978). That said, the conviction-based measure tends to produce results that match common perceptions about which states are
most corrupt (Maxwell and Winters 2005). Moreover, the list of most and least corrupt
states produced by this measure matches reasonably well with rankings produced by
other studies in the state corruption literature (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Conviction
counts also provide a relatively objective measure of corruption, unlike the surveybased measures that capture only perceptions of graft. This objectivity helps prevent
misspecification due to survey non-response error, measurement error, inconsistent
responses, and variation between samples (Glaeser and Saks 2006: 1058). Furthermore, because indictments are made by the U.S. Department of Justice, a centralized
federal agency insulated from state influence, enforcement is likely to be consistent
across the fifty states (Nice 198: 508).
As stated above, I normalize the number of corruption convictions by state population. While deflating convictions by the number of state public officials might be a
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more appropriate specification (Maxwell and Winters 2005), the U.S. Census Bureau
discontinued the report providing this data as of 1992 (U.S. Census Bureau 1995).
Consequently, the normalized variable would be outdated for cross-sectional studies of corruption in 2010 and distorted in years after 1992 due to lack of variation in
the variable denominator. Given that other studies of American state corruption normalize by population (Alt and Lassen 2011; Glaeser and Saks 2006) and that related
data is available on a yearly basis (U.S. Census Bureau 2014), I use conviction counts
divided by the state’s annual population in my analysis.
Independent Variables: Political Culture
For my primary independent variable, I use the proportion of women serving in
the state legislature. This proportion reflects the share of women in both chambers
of the state’s legislature (with the exception of Nebraska, which has a unicameral
legislature) and is available on an annual basis through the Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics (Center for American Women and Politics 2014). Another
important variable, the percentage of women with a college education, is available
through the U.S. Census Bureau, while female participation in the labor force can
be located in the U.S. Statistical Abstract (U.S. Census Bureau 2014; U.S. Statistical
Abstract 2012). Overall education, defined here as the percentage of the state population with a college degree, is also obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). To measure legislative professionalism, I employ the widely used
“Squire Index,” a composite variable that accounts for session length, legislator salary, and staff resources (Squire 2007) and is available through State Politics and Policy
Quarterly (State Politics and Political Quarterly 2014).
For other aspects of political culture, I turn to several indices commonly used in
state electoral studies. To quantify political competition, I employ the Ranney index,
which accounts for each party’s share of legislative seats and the gubernatorial vote,
as well as the occurrence of divided government. The index ranges from zero to one
(with zero signifying complete Republican control and one complete Democratic
control) and is available as a rolling average through Indiana State political scientist
Carl Klarner (Klarner 2013). Measures for citizen and elite ideology rely on the Berry
ideology index, which synthesizes ideological positions of congressional candidates
and district-level election results into statewide measures of citizen and elite ideology
(Berry et al. 1998: 331). These data are made available by Richard Fording (Fording 2014).
Control Variables: Institutions and Deterrence
To account for interstate variation in political institutions, I use variables for term
limits, direct initiatives, open primaries, recall laws, and transparency laws. I retrieve
data on term limits, open primaries, and recall laws from the website of the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), a nonpartisan organization that provides
interstate research on various policy initiatives for state legislators and staff. The term
limits variable is a binary field that indicates whether or not a law limiting legisla131

BELL
tive terms has taken effect in a given state, recognizing only those states where the
term limits law has restricted a legislator’s ability to run for office (NCSL 2014a).1 I
operationalize direct initiatives as the presence of a law that allows state citizens to
directly propose either a statute or Constitutional amendment (NCSL 2014b). The
variable for open primaries is also dichotomous and specifies whether a state’s primary nomination system is open to voters of all parties, while the binary variable for
recall laws indicates whether a state has legislation that allows voters to remove state
legislators from office (NCSL 2014b). I account for state transparency policies using
the 2008 Better Government transparency index, which rates states based on freedom
of information, open-meetings, whistleblower protection, and conflict of interest laws
(Better Government Association 2008).
To measure the effect of institutional deterrence on corruption, I use the ratio of
average state-worker to average private-worker salary and state police expenditures.
The ratio of public to private salary is an institutional practice that deters corruption
because public workers may be discouraged from corrupt behavior when they have
more salary to lose (Goel and Rich 198: 274). I calculate this ratio by dividing the average public worker salary by the average private worker salary for each state. The
average public employee salary is the total amount paid in state government salaries
divided by the total number of state employees, while the average private worker salary is the total salaries paid to private sector employees divided by the total number
of private sector workers. I obtain all data for these calculations from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA 2014). State police expenditures may also deter corruption
(Goel and Nelson 1998) and are measured using annual census estimates (U.S. Census Bureau 2014).
Finally, in order to ensure that my models do not suffer from omitted variable
bias, I include controls for a series of additional state economic and demographic variables, including income inequality, GSP per capita, household income, unemployment,
urbanization, and government revenue. I measure income inequality using state-level
Gini coefficients calculated by Mark Frank (Frank 2008). Information for Gross State
Product per capita and household income per capita are taken from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2014), while variables for annual unemployment percentages,
percent population living in urban areas, and government revenue (a proxy for government size) are again informed by U.S. Census Bureau data.2

Quantitative Framework and Results

As mentioned previously, this paper proposes to test the relationship between
corruption and female legislative representation in the American states, as well as
the underlying institutional and political cultural factors that could be responsible for this correlation. Accordingly, my quantitative analysis proceeds in the
following stages:
1. Replication of models from cross-national studies of female representation and
corruption using cross-sectional data from the United States.
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2. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female legislative representation on corruption in the presence of institutional and demographic controls.
3. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female representation on corruption, controlling for institutional deterrence.
4. Cross-sectional models to analyze the effect of female representation on corruption, controlling for elements of political culture not directly related to
female representation.
5. Cross-sectional models that substitute a measure for overall female opportunity for the female representation variable.
6. Fixed-effect models to account for latent determinants of corruption that vary
between states.
Unless otherwise specified, the dependent variable in each of the models is
the five-year lagged average of corruption convictions as of 2010, normalized by
state population. Lagged variables are advantageous because the averages reduce
the possibility that a single year with abnormally high (or low) corruption convictions will bias the regression estimates. This insulation from yearly fluctuation
is particularly beneficial because the American setting yields a relatively small
cross-sectional sample of only fifty cases. Second, the use of averages allows for
maximum comparability with the Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) study, as well
as studies in the American corruption literature, which also use variables averaged
across years (Meier and Holbrook 1992; Maxwell and Winters 2005; Glaeser and
Saks 2006). Because conviction counts are heavily right skewed, I take the log transformation of indictment counts after applying a simple shift parameter (n+1) to the
variable. The resulting dependent variable is normally distributed and produces
corruption rankings similar to those produced by measures in comparable studies
(Glaeser and Saks 2006).
Replication of International Models
In order to determine whether the same correlations observed in international
corruption studies occur among the American states, I use five ordinary least squares
regression models that include the state equivalents of the variables employed in the
specifications put forward by Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001). Models 1, 2, and 4 in
Table 1 illustrate that the proportion of women in state legislatures has a negative
impact on public official corruption conviction that is statistically significant at a 99
percent confidence level. Substantively speaking, the exponentiated coefficient for
women in the legislature indicates that a 1 percent increase in female legislators corresponds with a 4.7 percent decrease in corruption. This relationship holds in the presence of controls for education, gross state product, and region, in both 2010 and 1999.
While the inclusion of controls for region reduces the significance of female representation as a predictor of corruption in 2010 (see model 3), female representation
retains high levels of statistical significance in 1999, suggesting that the relationship
may vary over time. As a robustness check, I test the basic model again using Richard
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Table 1: Corruption and Female Legislators in the U.S.
Variables

Women in
Legislature

(1) 2010

(2) 2010

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (FiveYear Lagged Average)

Expert
Survey

-.0368***
(.0132)

Ln (GSP)
Ln(GSP)2

(3) 2010

(4) 1999

(5) 1999

-.0457***

-.0275*

-.0400***

-.0517**

(.0168)

(.0154)

(.0124)

(.0218)

-2.131

-2.644**

-5.173***

7.345***

(1.422)

(1.307)

(1.366)

(2.157)

.0817

.102*

.219***

-.280***

(.0583)

(.0530)

(.0594)

(.0999)

-.0808

.0276

-1.540**

(.222)

(.184)

(.652)

.126

-.0581

-1.060

(.240)

(.197)

(.701)

-.296

-.158

-.595

(.228)

(.210)

(.626)

Midwest
South
West
% College

.0186

-.0633

(.0210)

(.0583)

Ln (Population)

-.546
(1.281)

Constant

2.065***

15.51*

18.83**

32.22***

-32.31*

(.336)

(8.681)

(7.942)

(7.750)

(16.81)

Observations

50

50

50

49

46

R-squared

.17

.26

.30

.44

.35

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1

T. Boylan and Cheryl X. Long’s survey-based corruption measure and find that the
number of women in the legislature continues to have a significant, negative effect
on corruption rates. Thus, the results from my replication of the Dollar, Fisman, and
Gatti models suggest that despite the universal existence of liberal democracy in the
U.S., there is a non-trivial negative relationship between female participation in government and instances of state corruption.
Institutions, Economics, and Demographics
With the existence of a negative correlation between females in the legislature
and corruption in the American states relatively established, I proceed to examine
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whether the relationship holds in models that control for state economic, demographic, and institutional variables. The first model in Table 2 features controls for
state characteristics such as urbanization, real gross state product (GSP) per capita,
the log transformation of government revenue, and education. Consistent with other
studies, the sign and significance of the real GSP per capita variable suggest that more
affluent states tend to observe more corruption convictions (Alt and Lassen 2003).
Notably, the proportion of women in state legislatures continues to have a significant,
negative effect on corruption rates in the presence of demographic and economic
controls, providing further evidence for a cross-sectional link between female representation and corruption. Other models (not shown) that control for state income
inequality and unemployment support the same conclusion.3
Table 2 also indicates that the female representation variable retains statistical and substantive significance when I consider variation in political institutions
across states. The first model, which features institutional factors alone, achieves a
relatively poor fit, explaining only about 20 percent of the variance in corruption
convictions. When other state economic and demographic characteristics are also
included in the regression specification, the fit of the model improves substantially,
achieving a higher R-squared than the models that include either demographic
or institutional variables alone. Model 4 in Table 2 indicates that the presence of
term limits seems to correspond with higher rates of state corruption. Although
this finding seems counterintuitive, it may be that those states that adopt term
limits do so in response to already high levels of government corruption. The presence of direct initiatives, on the other hand, has a negative effect on corruption
that achieves modest levels of statistical significance. Likewise, high transparency
scores are negatively related to the number of corruption convictions in a state,
though the variable achieves only borderline levels of statistical significance. Taken
on the whole, the results from the four models in Table 2 suggest that the number
of women in the legislature maintains significance in the presence of institutional
controls, purely institutional models fail to achieve good fit, and institutional variables such as direct initiatives and transparency laws are associated with modest
reductions in corruption.
Institutional Deterrence
The first two models in Table 3 attempt to gauge the effect of state practices that
deter corruption by including variables for the ratio of public to private sector
worker salaries and state police expenditures. Neither variable comes close to conventional levels of statistical significance, nor do interaction terms that multiply
each deterrence variable on the percentage of female legislators (not shown). In
this model, state police expenditures and public official salary are not significantly
related to corruption. That said, the salary ratio and police expenditure variables do
not seem to fully capture the concept of deterrence. Despite this limitation, my analysis can still comment on the validity of institutional deterrence theories because
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Table 2: Corruption: Gender, Demographics, and Institutions
Variables

Demographics

Institutions

(1) 2010

(2) 2010

(3) 2010

(4) 2010

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (Five-Year Lagged Average)
Women in
Legislature
% Urban
Real GSP Per Capita
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)

-.0405**

-.0330**

-.0388***

(.0168)

(.0155)

(.0135)

-.0123*

-.00820

-.00264

(.00652)

(.00790)

(.00701)

.0288*

.0296**

.0235*

(.0146)

(.0144)

(.0135)

.0296

.0344

.0156

(.0339)

(.0343)

(.0370)

-.0444

-.101

(.0904)

(.0866)

% College Graduates .00416
(.0233)
Open Primaries

.0580
(.187)

Recall Law

-.144
(.216)

Term Limits
Direct Initiative
Transparency

.590**

.573**

(.259)

(.217)

-.488*

-.365

(.272)

(.229)

-.0204**

-.0124

(.00930)

(.00907)

Ln (Population)

-.0847
(.0793)

Constant

1.493

1.594

2.278***

2.852*

(1.305)

(1.266)

(.475)

(1.653)

Controls for Region

No

Yes

No

No

Observations

50

50

50

50

R-squared

.32

.34

.24

.42

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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enforcement is overseen by the Department of Justice, a federal agency independent from state governments, making the threat of enforcement relatively consistent
across states.4 In other words, because female representation is still a significant predictor of corruption when monitoring and enforcement are held constant, it appears
that institutional deterrence arguments fail to explain the link between gender and
corruption in the United States.
Table 3: Corruption, Political Culture, and Deterrence
(1) 2010

(2) 2005

(3) 2010

(4) 2005

Variables

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (Five-Year Lagged
Average)

Women in Legislature

-.0485***

-.0491***

-.0481***

-.0495***

(.0178)

(.0111)

(.0173)

(.0110)

.233

.258

.229

.254

(.607)

(.748)

(.604)

(.735)

.00417

.00153

.00546

.00163

(.00725)

(.00682)

(.00734)

(.00675)

-.0110

.00240

-.0112

.00235

(.00676)

(.00532)

(.00671)

(.00522)

.0280**

.0115

.0263**

.0119

(.0131)

(.00980)

(.0130)

(.00957)

.0228

-.0277

.0193

-.0281

(.0373)

(.0285)

(.0360)

(.0284)

-.0480

-.351**

-.0688

-.330***

(.0968)

(.138)

(.0907)

(.117)

Political Competition
Citizen Ideology
% Urban
Real GSP Per Capita
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)
Legislative Professionalism
Ratio of public/private
salary

1.305

1.382*

(.788)

(.744)

.687
(.837)

Police expenditures

1.30e-07
(3.45e-07)

Constant

.924

5.262***

1.922

5.084***

(1.777)

(1.494)

(1.320)

(1.322)

Observations

49

47

49

47

R-squared

.35

.42

.34

.42

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
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Political Culture
Now that I have analyzed the relationship between female representation and
corruption in the context of state demographics and political institutions, I examine
the effect of other political cultural factors on corruption convictions. Models 3 and 4
in Table 3 show the effect of cultural variables such as citizen ideology, political competition, and legislative professionalism on corruption. Because neither citizen ideology nor political competition have significant effects on indictment rates in either
2005 or 2010, it seems that differences in ideology and party heterogeneity between
states do not contribute meaningfully to the corruption equation.
As in previous models, the percentage of college-educated citizens does not
reach statistical significance in any model of corruption and political culture and is
not reported in Table 3. However, because overall levels of education correlate highly
with the percentage of women in the legislature, I revisit the importance of education
in the fixed-effects analysis described below. The addition of legislative professionalism
to the 2005 specification alters the fit of the model and dramatically influences the size
and significance of the coefficient for government revenue (since professionalism and
government size are closely related), though it achieves only marginal significance
in model 2. The positive coefficient suggests that a more professionalized legislature
corresponds with higher state indictment rates.5 Additional models (not shown) that
control for elite ideology, the percentage of Democrats in the state House of Representatives, and a binary field for divided government produce similar results. Overall,
models 3 and 4 indicate that ideology and political competition do not significantly
affect corruption, professionalized legislatures are modestly associated with higher
rates of indictment, and the percentage of female legislators continues to coincide
with statistically and substantively significant decreases in these rates.
Having assessed the relationship between gender and corruption in light of state
demographic and economic characteristics, institutions, and political culture, I present
models that simultaneously consider cultural and institutional factors. By including
both types of variables in a single model, I can make inferences about which variables
seem to have the strongest effect on corruption rates. To facilitate comparison with subsequent models, I rescale the percentage of women in the legislature variable to run
from zero to one. As has been the case in all of the models previously displayed, models 1 and 2 indicate that female representation has a significantly negative effect on
corruption, with a 1 percent increase in female representation corresponding to a 5.3
percent decrease in conviction indictments in 2010 (when the coefficient is exponentiated).6 The term limits coefficient remains positive and significant but seems to have
a weaker effect on corruption relative to female representation.
To better understand whether female representation or political cultural factors in
general are more strongly correlated with corruption rates, I introduce a measure that
accounts for a wide range of societal opportunities for women. This variable combines
the percentage of female legislators with the percentage of the female population par138
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ticipating in the labor force and the percentage of women with a college degree. The
resulting standardized index achieves an alpha coefficient of .84, and exploratory factor
analysis indicates the three variables load highly on a single factor. For ease of interpretation, I rescale the variable to run between zero and one. From a theoretical perspective,
I feel that by including variables that account for female participation in the workforce,
higher education, and political office, I produce a measure that encompasses three highly
relevant categories of civic life, even if the measure is not exhaustive.
Models 3 and 4 indicate that the coefficient for the female opportunity index
has a significantly larger substantive impact than every other variable in the model,
suggesting that relatively high levels of female opportunity correspond with dramatically lower levels of corruption. While I cannot include the female opportunity index
and female representation variable in the same model due multicollinearity, comparing the coefficients across otherwise identical models suggests that overall female
opportunity has a substantively larger negative effect on corruption than representation alone. I argue that because the index accounts for female opportunity in general
rather than focusing solely on political representation, the index is a better indicator
of political culture and, ultimately, a stronger predictor of corruption.
To put this difference in perspective, the female legislative representation variable produces a coefficient of -2.08 in 2010, more than one and a half times smaller
than the -3.35 coefficient value achieved by the female opportunity index in the same
year. In 2005, the female opportunity index coefficient was more than twice as large as
the female representation variable. Although I cannot formally test the difference-indifferences for the two variables (via an interaction term) due to collinearity, I argue
that the markedly consistent differences in magnitude provide at least suggestive evidence that the female opportunity variable has a larger negative effect on corruption.
I am further encouraged by the results of robustness checks that replicate the Table 4
models using the expert survey measure (see Table 5). These alternative models yield
similar results, with the female opportunity index registering an even larger negative effect on state corruption levels relative to female representation. Based on these
findings, I assert that female opportunity in general has a stronger negative impact
on corruption than female legislative representation alone. Moreover, because female
opportunity, inherently bound up in a state’s political values, norms, and ideas about
gender roles, is a representation of political culture, models 3 and 4 suggest that cultural factors have a substantively stronger cross-sectional effect on corruption than
the institutional factors that I consider in my empirical tests.
Fixed-Effect Models
Of course, it is highly plausible that the female opportunity measure serves as a
proxy for underlying societal constructs also related to corruption. In order to further
evaluate the relationship between corruption, gender, and the latent cultural factors
that female representation and opportunity may represent, I use fixed-effect regressions
to analyze panel data that spans between 1983 and 2010. Fixed-effect regressions cre139
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ate a series of dichotomous variables, designating the state to which each observation
pertains, allowing me to control for omitted independent variables that vary between
Table 4: Corruption: Combined and Female Opportunity Models
(1) 2010

(2) 2005

(3) 2010

(4) 2005

Variables

Log of Normalized Corruption Convictions (Five-Year Lagged
Average)

Women in Legislature

-2.077***

-1.970***

(0.533)

(0.435)

Female Opportunity Index
Real GSP Per Capita
% Urban
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)
Term Limits
Direct Initiative
Transparency
Political Competition
Citizen Ideology

-4.117***

(0.891)

(0.741)

0.025*

0.024**

0.038**

0.038***

(0.014)

(0.001)

(0.014)

(0.009)

-0.004

-0.003

-0.012

-0.009

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.008)

(0.006)

-.0047

-0.014

-0.012

-0.022

(0.039)

(0.029)

(0.043)

(0.025)

-0.099

-0.348***

-0.137

-0.352***

(0.092)

(0.113)

(0.095)

(0.090)

0.604***

-0.040

0.565**

-0.0795

(0.208)

(0.175)

(0.226)

(0.181)

-0.218

0.450**

-0.176

0.279

(0.223)

(0.202)

(0.245)

(0.207)

-0.015

-0.011

(0.011)

(0.011)

0.411

0.851

-0.341

-0.796

(0.599)

(0.696)

(0.689)

(0.713)

0.008

0.001

0.010

0.007

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.006)

Legislative Professionalism
Constant

-3.346***

1.305*

1.147*

(0.722)

(0.620)

2.762*

4.525***

4.715**

6.989***

(1.467)

(1.194)

(1.874)

(1.304)

Observations

49

47

49

49

R-squared

0.47

0.51

0.45

0.53

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Robustness Check: Combined and Female Opportunity Models
(1) 1999

(2) 1999

(3) 1999

(4) 1999

Variables

State Corruption: Survey of House of Representatives Reporters

% Women in Legislature

-2.155**

-2.167**

(Rescaled 0–1)

(0.936)

(0.947)

Female Opportunity Index
Real GSP Per Capita
% Urban
Per Capita Income
Ln (Revenue)
Term Limits
Direct Initiative
Political Competition
Citizen Ideology
Legislative
ism
Constant

-6.627***

-6.613***

(0.888)

(0.945)

-0.020

-0.017

0.019

0.022

(0.033)

(0.035)

(0.023)

(0.025)

0.038**

0.040***

0.039***

0.040***

(0.015)

(0.014)

(0.011)

(0.011)

0.020

0.050

0.030

0.059

(0.059)

(0.062)

(0.051)

(0.054)

0.010

0.183

-0.208

-0.043

(0.213)

(0.255)

(0.176)

(0.206)

-1.943***

-1.944***

-1.503**

-1.509***

(0.633)

(0.597)

(0.574)

(0.523)

0.208

0.138

0.191

0.114

(0.367)

(0.379)

(0.292)

(0.281)

3.321***

3.174***

1.946**

1.798*

(1.008)

(1.084)

(0.901)

(0.933)

-0.003

-0.001

0.003

0.005

(0.015)

(0.016)

(0.010)

(0.011)

Professional-

-1.309

-1.203

(1.271)

(1.118)

0.646

-1.698

4.949**

2.717

(2.372)

(2.738)

(2.209)

(2.425)

Observations

45

43

45

43

R-squared

0.50

0.52

0.69

0.72

Control variables are 5-year lagged averages. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

states but do not vary over time (Stock and Watson 2003). In addition to fixed effects
for state, I use cluster robust standard errors based on the state variable and include
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dichotomous variables indicating the five-year period to which each observation pertains. Panel regression is useful for this analysis, because it provides a way to determine
whether the relationships between female representation and corruption and female
opportunity and corruption are significant across time, controlling for omitted withinstate variables. These results will also help me determine whether the variables for
female representation and female opportunity are mere proxies for other within-state
cultural values, institutions, and characteristics I cannot include in my models.
The fixed-effect regressions in Table 6 include variables similar to those in the
cross-sectional models, though some variables are omitted because data are not available over the course of the entire panel.7 Instead of using the lagged average of normalized corruption, the dependent variable used in the cross-sectional regressions,
I use the log transformation of yearly corruption counts, normalized by population.
Model 1 shows that controlling for time period and fixed-effects for states, the proportion of female legislators ceases to have a significant negative effect on corruption
convictions. Instead, most of the variation between states is explained by unobserved
state factors, as evidenced by the large and highly significant constant value. While
female legislative representation is no longer significant, the female opportunity
index continues to have a significant negative impact on logged conviction rates,
though the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly lower than in cross-sectional
models. Based on the large, significant constant values (which represent the impact of
between-state differences for which the model does not account), it seems that female
opportunity may serve as a proxy for other within-state factors in cross-sectional
models. The variable for overall education is also significant when regressed against
corruption rates over time, suggesting that states with higher-than-average percentages of college graduates tend to have lower corruption conviction counts over time.
That the variables for both overall education and female opportunity (which is
partially comprised of a measure for female education) remain statistically and substantively significant over time, while female political representation does not suggests that education may have the largest impact on corruption counts. Indeed, when
I replace the female opportunity index with the female education variable (Table
6, model 5), the coefficient of the female education variable (-1.47) alone is nearly
identical to the female opportunity index variable. That said, a similar model (not
shown) indicates that the percentage of women in the labor force is also a significant (p=.06) and substantive (β=-1.11) correlate of low corruption levels.8 Moreover,
an index measure that combines the female education and women in the labor force
variables has a substantively large coefficient (β=-1.87). The discrepancy between
this two-item index and the three-item female opportunity index illustrates the need
to find additional measures of female opportunity. That said, the continued significance of female labor participation and female education suggests that low levels of
normalized corruption convictions cannot be attributed to overall education alone.
Rather, uniquely female factors appear to be strongly related to low levels of cor142
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Table 6: Fixed Effect Regressions: 1983–2010
Log of Corruption Convictions
Variables

(1) Gender

% Women in Legislature

0.218

(Rescaled 0–1)

(0.328)

Female Opportunity Index

(2) Female
(3) EducaOpportunity tion

(4) Female
Education
& Labor

(5) Female
Education

-1.488**
(0.720)

Education

-1.293***
(0.407)

Female Education & Labor

-1.874***
(0.603)

Female Education

-1.467***
(0.346)

Real GSP per capita
Income per capita
Ln (Population)
Term Limits

0.005

0.009

0.012

0.012

0.010

(0.009)

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.0104)

-0.0003

-0.0004

-0.0004

-0.0004

-0.0000

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.854***

-0.928***

-0.834***

-0.834***

-1.211***

(0.308)

(0.329)

(0.301)

(0.301)

(0.337)

0.140

0.133

0.142

0.142

0.154

(0.092)

(0.095)

(0.093)

(0.093)

(0.099)

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

-0.001

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

13.64***

15.62***

13.98***

20.08***

15.71***

Citizen Ideology
Government Ideology

0.001
(0.002)

Constant

(4.540)

(4.963)

(4.458)

(5.098)

(4.419)

State Fixed-Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Controls for Time Period

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

1,190

1,190

1,190

1,190

1,190

R-squared

0.38

0.39

0.39

0.40

0.40

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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ruption.9 In short, while the variable representing the proportion of women in state
legislatures ceases to be significant over time, female education and the percentage of
women in the labor force remain strong predictors of corruption convictions.
While the female opportunity index, education, and modified index variables
are significantly related to corruption convictions, much of the variation in indictments can be attributed to within-state factors that I cannot capture in my quantitative models. Since the factors that contribute to the large constant values in the
panel analyses cannot be observed, it is unclear whether the remaining variation in
corruption convictions can be explained by institutional or cultural factors or something else. However, because the female opportunity index and overall education
variables are significantly related to lower levels of corruption, it seems that political
culture has an important effect on indictment rates, controlling for many important
state institutional, demographic, and economic traits.

Discussion

To recap the results of my empirical tests, I revisit my initial hypotheses. I first
postulated that the cross-sectional relationship between the proportion of females in
the legislature and corruption would be statistically significant among the American
states. Evidence from cross-sectional regressions for two years and two distinct corruption dependent variables suggests that corruption and female legislative representation are significantly related. Next, I hypothesized that the correlation between
corruption and the proportion of female legislators would hold in the presence
of institutional controls. My results offer support for this hypothesis and suggest
that institutional factors alone fail to explain substantial variation in corruption convictions. Furthermore, because the association between female representation and
corruption remains statistically and substantively significant within the highly democratic context of the U.S., democratic institutional factors alone do not adequately
explain the relationship between gender and corruption.
I also speculated that institutional deterrence would not have an independent negative effect on corruption. Models with controls for institutional corruption disincentives,
combined with the inherent controls of independent federal enforcement, suggest that
accounting for deterrence does not alter the relationship between gender and corruption. Finally, I hypothesized that overall female opportunity would have a stronger
negative correlation with corruption levels and that the significance of the female representation variable would diminish in longitudinal models. My analysis suggests that
female opportunity has a stronger impact on corruption in both the short and long term.
I contend that a broader conception of female opportunity that considers female opportunity in education, politics, and the labor force is a more comprehensive representation
of political culture, with female education and labor force activity being the most powerful drivers of the correlation between female opportunity and low levels of corruption.
I stress that this study does not assert that the number of women in government
influences corruption because of innate feminine superiority, since the data I use does
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not lend itself to these types of inferences. Instead, I argue that state political cultures
that encourage women to participate equally in various aspects of community life
tend to support other values that discourage corrupt behavior. Thus, while achieving
higher levels of female political representation is a goal that should be pursued for its
own sake, artificially adding women to government may not prove a viable solution
to corruption unless accompanied by corresponding shifts in cultural values. Future
attitudinal research may provide insights into whether American states with higher
support for gender egalitarianism are actually less corrupt. The enormous amounts of
variance attributable to between-state differences in the fixed effects regression models indicates that unique local dynamics have a profound effect on rates of corruption.
At the same time, the significance of female opportunity as a negative correlate of
corruption suggests that measures of overall female opportunity are a useful way to
evaluate the effect of political culture on corruption conviction rates.

Conclusion

In sum, after analyzing the relationship between female legislative representation
and corruption in the U.S., I have introduced evidence suggesting that the correlations
observed in cross-national studies hold within a highly liberal democratic context in the
presence of various institutional, demographic, and cultural controls. I have also introduced an original index to measure female opportunity and found that this index has
a meaningful, negative relationship with state corruption. My analysis indicates that
significant variation in corruption rates can be traced to between state factors that go
unobserved in the models I present. Though the link between gender and corruption is
far from clear, my research suggests that levels of female opportunity are a useful way
to understand the effect of political culture on corruption in the United States.
NOTES
1. I focus on term limit laws that have taken effect, because after term limits are enacted, there
is often a significant lag between passing and implementing the actual limit, during which
time several laws have been stricken down or repealed (NCSL 2014a).
2. The following variables were obtained through both the U.S. Census Bureau and the State Politics and Policy Quarterly data center: percent population living in urban areas, education, gross
state product, state revenue, and police expenditures. Data in years 1983–2005 are provided by
SPPQ, while data from later years is collected from the census. The percentage of females in
the labor force was collected by SPPQ for years before 1999; I retrieved later data from the U.S.
Statistical Abstract.
3. Omitting the variable for percentage of college graduates in the state actually improves the fit
of the model, suggesting that education correlates highly with another variable in the model.
I provide further discussion of the education variable in subsequent models.
4. In line with previous research, I would like to control for variables that explain degrees of
enforcement such as the number of U.S. attorneys per capita and state U.S. attorney office
prosecutorial expenditures (see, for example, Alt and Lassen 2011). Unfortunately, I cannot
include these variables due to a lack of publicly available data.
5. I do not test legislative professionalism in the 2010 model due to data availability constraints.
6. In order to report the exponentiated coefficient in percentage terms, I first run the model using
the original the percentage of women in the legislature (not rescaled). Because the variable
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has the same relative values, other coefficients are identical for both versions of the female
representation variable.
7. Because no new states adopted a new open primary or direct initiative measure after 1983, the
binary fields representing these statutes are not included in the panel analysis, since they do
not vary over the years covered by the panel sample.
8. For purposes of comparison, I rescale the female political representation, female education,
overall education, and female participation in the labor force variables to run between zero
and one.
9. Ideally, I would compare the relative magnitude of these coefficients directly via an interaction term in the same regression model. Due to multicollinearity concerns, however, I cannot
include the variables in the same model.
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